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ABSTRACT 
Around 2005, maritime piracy made a troubling resurgence three quarters 
of a century after a consensus had been reached that the age of piracy 
had permanently ended. Yet piracy returned in a slightly different form, 
with pirates relying more on land-based facilitators than their historical 
counterparts. Maritime piracy’s reappearance made ripe for consideration 
the question of whether a facilitator of maritime piracy must be physically 
present on the high seas while facilitating in order to be subject  to 
universal jurisdiction. This Article undertakes an analysis of the text, 
statutory context, history, and policy impetus behind UNCLOS art. 101 
as it relates to universal jurisdiction over facilitators. It finds  that the 
weight of the evidence suggests that a high seas requirement  in fact 
exists for facilitators of piracy jure gentium. From there, the article 
considers the likely implications of such a requirement on modern 
facilitators of maritime piracy. Through the lens of political economy, 
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the Article asserts that universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions pose 
something of a commons problem, or, alternatively, a public goods 
problem. Because rational actors operating in a market tend to internalize 
externalities and under-produce public goods, this theory suggests that 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions should be quite rare, and state practice 
confirms that hypothesis. In short, this article argues that there is a high 
seas requirement for inciters and intentional facilitators of piracy jure 
gentium, but the existence of this requirement is unlikely to affect the 
impunity of facilitators. 
Can it be believed that the legislature intended to punish with death the subject 
of a foreign prince, who, within the dominions of that prince, should advise a 
person, about to sail in the ship of his sovereign, to commit murder or robbery? 
            - Chief Justice John Marshall, United States Supreme Court1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Marshall posed the above question regarding a 1790 
statute which punished accessories before and after the fact to acts of 
maritime piracy in the 1818 case United States v. Palmer.2 Although the 
Chief Justice intended the question as a hypothetical that should be 
answered in the negative, it remained just that—a hypothetical—for 
almost two centuries. 
Then, in 2011, United States law enforcement officials arrested Ali 
Mohamed Ali when his plane landed at Dulles International Airport.3 
Ali, who was serving as Director General of the Ministry of Education in 
Somaliland, was en route to an educational conference in North Carolina. 
He was charged with inter alia, piracy under the law of nations.4 A 
Somali citizen, Ali was charged with negotiating on behalf of other 
Somalis who captured a Bahamian-flagged, Danish-owned ship and held 
its Russian, Georgian, and Estonian crew hostage for sixty-nine days.5 
His prosecution in the U.S. is therefore predicated purely on the theory 
1. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 633 (1818).
2. Punishment of Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 10–11, 1 Stat. 112, 114.
3. United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2012).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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of universal jurisdiction6 since the government stipulated that Ali did not 
intentionally facilitate piracy while physically present on the high seas.7 
Around the same time, a federal grand jury charged Mohammad Saali 
Shibin for his role as a negotiator in the hijacking of the MV Marida 
Marguerite, a German-owned Marshall Islands flagged vessel with a 
crew of nineteen Indians, two Bangladeshis, and one Ukrainian.8 Like 
Ali, Shibin did not board the ship until it was “just off the coast of 
Somalia,” so the United States’ case against him for his actions aboard 
the Marida Marguerite rests solely on the theory of universal jurisdiction. 
Thus Ali and Shibin, the subjects of a foreign “prince” and “within the 
dominion of that prince,” both advised persons who had just sailed the 
high seas how to successfully complete the robbery. They thereby 
transformed Chief Justice Marshall’s question from hypothetical into 
reality. After 200 years, the question of whether universal jurisdiction 
exists for facilitators of piracy who do not facilitate from the high seas or 
any other place outside the jurisdiction of a state is finally ripe for 
serious consideration. 
The ripeness of the question of a high seas requirement for facilitators 
of piracy goes beyond the purely legal. It speaks directly to the manner 
in which the international community goes about bringing an end to the 
scourge of piracy on the high seas. The geography of Somalia, combined 
with a lack of economic opportunities in the state, has led to a situation 
with no shortage of Somali men and boys willing to risk their lives as 
pirates. Prosecuting individuals higher up on the criminal conspiracy 
chain, those who invariably operate from within the territory of a single 
state, is seen as a more effective method of achieving deterrence through 
criminal justice than low-level prosecutions alone.9 Thus whether there 
 
 6.  See Eugene Volokh, From Prof. Eugene Kontorovich, About Today’s Piracy 
Decision, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 13, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.volokh. 
com/2012/07/13/from-prof-eugene-kontorovich-about-todays-piracy-decision/. 
 7.  Martha Neil, Federal Judge Blasts US Prosecutors for “Unbelievably Inexcusable 
Behavior” in Somali Piracy Case, A.B.A J. (July 23, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_blasts_prosecution_in_somali_piracy_case_for
_unbelievably_ine/. 
 8.  United States v. Shibin, No. 2:11CR33, 2012 WL 8231152, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 16, 2012). Also note Shibin was charged for his role in the hijacking of the Quest in 
which four United States citizens were killed. Id. at *1. Because the United States has 
jurisdiction over Shibin under the passive personality theory of jurisdiction, Shibin’s role 
in the Quest raises separate legal questions from the ones addressed here. 
 9.  See Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
Remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies: U.S. Approaches to Counter-
Piracy (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/159419.htm 
(“Furthermore, [the U.S. Department of State is] looking at additional ways to more 
aggressively target those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations, including 
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is a high seas requirement for land-based facilitators has a direct bearing 
on the optimal strategy for gathering evidence against and prosecuting 
those most responsible for the resurgence of piracy off the Horn of 
Africa. This paper seeks to address both the legal question of whether a 
high seas requirement exists and the practical results that flow from the 
disposition of that question. It argues that there is indeed a high seas 
requirement for facilitators of piracy jure gentium under customary 
international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but such a requirement is not likely to result 
in impunity for inciters and intentional facilitators of piracy who operate 
solely from dry land. 
Part II of this article characterizes the uncertainty around a high seas 
requirement for pirate facilitators, providing some historical context to 
the legal debate. Part III considers whether there is a high seas requirement 
for facilitators of piracy jure gentium.It concludes that, while the question is 
ultimately one that will be answered by state practice, there is strong 
evidence suggesting that UNCLOS and customary international law 
place a high seas requirement on pirate facilitators. In considering this 
question, Part III evaluates the text of UNCLOS art. 101, its context, 
drafting history, and several plausible policy reasons for piracy’s status 
as the original—and for centuries the sole—universal jurisdiction offense. 
Part IV shifts focus from whether there is a high seas requirement to 
what the implications of such a requirement might be. Political economic 
theory predicts very few universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions, and 
state practice shows that such prosecutions are quite rare. Ultimately, 
Part IV concludes that the existence of a high seas requirement for 
facilitators of piracy will have a very limited effect on impunity of 
facilitators. Part V provides some concluding remarks. 
II.  THE SOURCE OF THE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
The respective histories of the crime of maritime piracy and the 
positive international law regulating maritime piracy overlap less than 
one might imagine. This is due to the fact that most positive international 
law dealing with piracy was codified during a time when actual incidents 
 
disrupting the financial networks that support them.”); see also ROBERT HAYWOOD & 
ROBERTA SPIVAK, MARITIME PIRACY 106–11 (2012). 
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of piracy were relatively rare.10 One possible consequence of this lack of 
overlap is that the law of maritime piracy may not fully account for its 
modern nature.11 In its modern resurgence, pirate tactics changed markedly. 
Modern pirates rely much more on land-based facilitators, ranging from 
investors to hostage negotiators, than did their historical counterparts. As 
a result of this increased reliance, the question of whether inciters and 
intentional facilitators of piracy are subject to a high seas requirement 
has become as important as it is unsettled. 
 
 
The above figure illustrates this phenomenon nicely. The line graph 
was made using Google’s Ngram service,12 a tool that allows users to 
track the use of a given word or phrase in proportion to all words or 
phrases that appeared in eight million of the approximately twenty million 
books scanned by Google to date.13 The data suggest that maritime 
piracy was important until the turn of the twentieth century, after which 
it was given much less attention. The issue was not revived until the turn 
 
 10.  See Scott Davidson, Dangerous waters: Combating maritime piracy in Asia, 9 
ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 5 (2000) (“There was a lack of attention devoted to the drafting of 
the provisions on piracy at UNCLOS III; it is attributable to the fact that, by that time, it 
was thought that maritime piracy was of such little practical concern . . . as to require 
scant consideration.”). 
 11.   Id. 
 12.  GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2013). 
 13.  Ben Zimmer, Bigger, Better Google Ngrams: Brace Yourself for the Power of 
Grammar, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2010/10/bigger-better-google-ngrams-brace-yourself-for-the-power-of- 
grammar/263487. 
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of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, as the chart also illustrates, 
virtually all of the positive international law concerning maritime piracy 
was considered and codified during piracy’s wane. The narrative history 
of maritime piracy and the law governing such piracy mirrors the graphic 
representation above to a considerable extent. 
The earliest references to piracy can be found in cuneiform writings 
dating around 2000 B.C.,14 and robbery and violence on the high seas 
has captured the public imagination ever since. The popular image of 
pirates seems frozen around piracy’s “Golden Age,”15 during which 
Barbary pirates played a role in the capture and enslavement of European 
travelers between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.16 This was 
undoubtedly the peak of piracy at sea. By 1932 the British historian Philip 
Gosse asserted that the age of piracy had “permanently ended.”17 Indeed, 
twentieth century piracy was marked by sporadic, low-level attacks such 
that Gosse’s 1932 assertion began to appear quite prescient.18 However, the 
early twenty-first century saw a troubling resurgence of maritime piracy, 
particularly off the horn of Africa, where in 2010 pirates attacked 445 ships, 
hijacked 53 ships, and captured 1,181 hostages.19 After a seventy year lull 
that occurred roughly between 1930 and 2000, maritime piracy was once 
again a practical issue for lawmakers and lawyers to grapple with. 
Early on, the positive law that criminalized maritime piracy closely 
tracked the crime it attempted to regulate. Though pirates had been 
executed for millennia regardless of their nationality, Cicero is widely 
regarded as coining the phrase communis hostis omnium, or “common 
enemies of the world” in the first century B.C. to describe pirates as 
criminals of a fundamentally international character.20  Just as piracy 
experienced its “Golden Age” between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
 
 14.  HAYWOOD & SPIVAK, supra note 9, at 24. 
 15.  FRANK SHERRY, RAIDERS AND REBELS: THE GOLDEN AGE OF PIRACY 7 (1986). 
 16.  See ROBERT C. DAVIS, CHRISTIAN SLAVES, MUSLIM MASTERS: WHITE SLAVERY 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE BARBARY COAST, AND ITALY, 1500-1800 141 (2003). 
 17.  PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 297–98 (1932). 
 18.  See, e.g., Andrew Mwangura, Indian Ocean Piracy: 1990-2001, ECOP (Sept. 
2, 2001), http://www.ecop.info/english/ind-oce-pir-1990-2001.htm (noting that only six 
pirate attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia between 1990 and 2001). 
 19.  ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU ANN. REP. 1 JAN.–31 DEC. 2010, PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (Jan. 2011) (on file with the author); see also Pirates seized 
record 1,181 hostages in 2010–report, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2011, 5:23 AM), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12214905. 
 20.  See M. TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO IN TWENTY-EIGHT VOLUMES: DE OFFICIIS [ON 
DUTIES] 385 (Walter Miller trans., 1913). 
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centuries, early transnational regulation of piracy peaked in 1684 when 
the English Parliament passed An Act for the More Effectual Suppression 
of Piracy. This act established Vice Admiralty Courts throughout the 
British Empire in an attempt to sentence pirates.21 Several centuries 
later, only five years before Philip Gosse proclaimed piracy dead, the 
International Court of Justice found that maritime piracy was a crime 
against the law of nations, noting, “in its jurisdictional aspects, [piracy] 
is sui generis.”22 
Yet during the twentieth century, the practice of maritime piracy 
began to diverge from its regulation. Though the actual incidence of piracy 
dropped markedly between 1930 and 2000, it was during this period that 
the international law of maritime piracy—including its definition—was 
codified and ultimately accepted as part of customary international law. 
The modern definition of piracy was first announced in a comprehensive 
manner as part of the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy.23 It was 
then modified slightly by the International Law Commission in 1956 for 
inclusion in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,24 and was 
subsequently copied verbatim from the Geneva Convention into the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.25 By the 
year 2000, 134 countries had ratified UNCLOS.26 Today, even countries 
that have not ratified the treaty, such as the United States, have accepted 
the UNCLOS definition of piracy as an accurate reflection of customary 
international law.27 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, high seas piracy 
returned in a different, less centralized form from the one it took in years 
prior. Historically, maritime piracy occurred entirely at sea, as the pirate 
ship approached the victim ship, boarded it, robbed it, and sailed away. 
Today, Somali piracy, which represents over half of contemporary global 
attacks,28 more closely resembles an organized crime syndicate than the 
 
 21. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, in 3 BRITISH PIRACY IN 
THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660-1730, at 59–60 (Joel H. Baer ed., 
2007). 
 22.  S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment No. 9, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 
70 (Sept. 7). 
 23.  Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 739, 749 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention]. 
 24.  Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
 25.  UNCLOS, infra note 32. 
 26.  See Chronological lists, infra note 34. 
 27.  See U.S. DIGEST OF INT’L LAW, infra note 34. 
 28.  2011 Piracy Attacks Totaled 439; 275 off Somalia: ICC/IMB Report, INS. J. 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ international/2012/01/19/231822.htm 
(noting that Somali pirates accounted for approximately 54% of attacks on ships in 2011). 
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antics of Captain Jack Sparrow. Rather than simply robbing the victim 
ship, Somali pirates board a large merchant vessel and hold its cargo and 
crew hostage, reaping ransoms that averaged around $5 million in 2011.29 
Moreover, modern pirates rely on territorially-based support, which comes 
from financiers on the front end,30 local suppliers of provisions during the 
ordeal, and hostage negotiators on the back-end.31  In fact, due to the 
relative abundance of Somalis willing to act as low-level pirates, many 
view the prosecution of land-based operators as the most effective use of 
judicial mechanisms to end the scourge of piracy.32 
In sum, pirates’ shifting tactics have led to a great deal of uncertainty 
around a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators. Therefore, a definitive 
answer to the question of jurisdiction is more important than ever. The 
following section seeks to answer the question in a way that, even if not 
definitive, should provide a starting point for further consideration 
and debate. 
III.  A HIGH SEAS REQUIREMENT FOR FACILITATION OF                                
PIRACY JURE GENTIUM 
It is abundantly clear that piracy under the law of nations, or piracy 
jure gentium, is a crime of universal jurisdiction.33 It is equally clear that 
 
 29.  Anna Bowden & Shikah Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 at 
11 (One Earth Future Found., Working Paper, 2011) [hereinafter ECOP], available at http:// 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf [hereinafter 
ECOP]. 
 30.  See, e.g., Anthony O’Donnell, Pirate Financiers See Robust Returns in Tough 
Economy, INS. J. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.insurancetech.com/security/pirate-financiers- 
see-robust-returns-in/240007590. 
 31.  See, e.g., Sarah Wolfe, Somali pirate gets 12 life terms in boat hijackings, 
GLOBAL POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/ 
americas/united-states/120813/somali-pirate-gets-12-life-terms-boat-hijackings; Toan Quy-
Do et al., The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation at xxiv (World 
Bank Report, 2013) [hereinafter World Bank Report], available at http://www-wds.worldbank. 
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/06/00033303720130506120556/ 
Rendered/PDF/767130WP0REPLA0alia0main0report0web.pdf. 
 32.  See Shapiro, supra note 9; see also HAYWOOD & SPIVAK, supra note 9. 
 33.  E.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 105, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (“On the high seas, or in any other 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, 
or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the 
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed . . . .”). 
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the definition of piracy under customary international law is reflected in 
art. 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),34 which states: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
or against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).35 
The outer bounds of universal jurisdiction over maritime piracy, however, 
are much less apparent. Particularly, it remains an open question whether 
an inciter or intentional facilitator of piracy (hereinafter simply referred 
to as a “facilitator”) must be physically present on the high seas to commit 
piracy jure gentium and therefore be subject to universal jurisdiction. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies a general rule 
of interpretation that the language of treaties is to be primarily interpreted in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the context of 
the treaty as a whole.36 If this general approach leaves the meaning of 
the terms in question ambiguous or obscure, the Vienna Convention 
states, “[r]ecourse may be had to ary means of interpretation, including 
 
 34.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF 
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2010, 111 (Elizabeth R. Wilcox ed., 
2011) [hereinafter U.S. DIGEST OF INT’L LAW], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/179316.pdf (“[T]he actions and statements of the Executive Branch over 
more than six decades reflect the consistent U.S. view that [the UNCLOS art. 101] 
definition is both reflective of customary international law and universally accepted 
by states.”); see also U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and 
the related Agreements as of 23 January 2013 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [hereinafter Chronological 
lists] (listing the 165 states that have ratified UNCLOS). 
 35.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101. 
 36.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion . . . .”37 
Although scholars have rightly pointed out that the Vienna Convention is 
not the sole authority of treaty interpretation under international law,38 it 
is an excellent starting point for any interpretive endeavor. Moreover, it 
is especially well suited to the task at hand due to the relationship 
between UNCLOS and customary international law. With the Vienna 
Convention’s prescriptions in mind, this section examines the plain 
language, statutory context, drafting history, and underlying policy rationale 
behind UNCLOS art. 101(c) and concludes that, although the question 
remains one to be answered by state practice, a high seas requirement for 
pirate facilitators appears to exist under international law. 
A.  The Plain Language of UNCLOS Art. 101 is Ambiguous                           
as to a High Seas Requirement 
Opponents of a high seas requirement contrast the language of 
UNCLOS arts. 101(a) and 101(c) as their primary argument against such 
a requirement. The phrase, “on the high seas,” opponents note, is present 
in art. 101(a)39 and absent in art. 101(c).40 This phrase carries an enormous 
amount of weight in opponents’ arguments, who assert that the only 
plausible reading of the divergence between arts. 101(a) and (c)—which 
address direct perpetrators of piracy and facilitators of piracy, respectively 
—is that a high seas requirement exists for direct perpetrators and not for 
facilitators. Proponents of a high seas requirement for facilitators offer 
an alternative plausible reading of the text: that “on the high seas” was 
meant to differentiate high seas piracies from those occurring on terra 
nullius. These dual readings render the text of UNCLOS art. 101  
ambiguous as to a high seas requirement for facilitators. 
The strongest argument against a high seas requirement for pirate 
facilitators comes from a purely textual analysis, contrasting the language of 
UNCLOS art. 101(a) with the language of UNCLOS art. 101(c). Art. 101(a) 
relates to the actual perpetrators of piracy and states, in pertinent part, that 
“[p]iracy consists of . . . any illegal acts of violence or detention . . . 
 
 37.  Id. art. 32. 
 38.  E.g., Zhang Nai-gen, On International Law of Treaty Interpretation, 6 CAN. 
SOC. SCI., no. 6, 2010, at 16–17 (describing alternative methods of treaty interpretation). 
 39.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101(a). 
 40.  Id. art. 101(c). 
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directed . . . on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft . . . [or] against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State. . . .”41 Contrast the language in art. 101(a) with that contained in 
101(c), the section concerning facilitators, which says that piracy also 
consists of “. . . any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) . . . .”42 
Conspicuously absent from art. 101(c), opponents argue, is  the 
modifier “on the high seas” contained in art. 101(a) and applied to direct 
perpetrators.43 From this discrepancy, opponents conclude that UNCLOS 
creates discrete piracy offenses, one of which is governed by art. 101(a) 
and contains a high seas requirement and another that is governed by art. 
101(c) and contains no such requirement.44 They argue that, if acts of 
facilitation must occur on the high seas along with direct acts of 
perpetration, the “high seas” language used in UNCLOS art. 101(a)(i) 
would be rendered otiose.45  However, there is an equally plausible reading 
of the plain language of UNCLOS art. 101 that leaves room for a high 
seas requirement for pirate facilitators. 
Under this alternative reading, there are three classes of  acts that 
constitute piracy jure gentium—direct commission, voluntary participation 
in the operation of a pirate ship, and acts of facilitation—and each must 
be committed from the high seas or a place outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any state for universal jurisdiction to attach. For proponents, 
the presence of the phrase, “[o]n the high seas” in art. 101(a)(i) reflects 
the drafters’ concern with clarifying that piracy jure gentium could be 
committed against victims on the high seas or on terra nullius, the latter 
case being described in UNCLOS art. 101(a)(ii) as “a place outside the 
 
 41.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101(a). 
 42.  Id. art. 101(c). 
 43.  Id. art. 101(a), (c). 
 44.  See Douglas Guilfoyle, Committing Piracy on Dry Land: Liability for 
Facilitating Piracy, EJIL: TALK! (July 26, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/committing-
piracy-on-dry-land-liability-for-facilitating-piracy/; see also Roger L. Phillips, Intentional 
Facilitation and Commission of Piracy as part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise, COMMUNIS 
HOSTIS OMNIUM (July 26, 2012), http://piracy-law.com/2012/07/26/intentional-facilitation-
and-commission-of-piracy-as-part-of-a-joint-criminal-enterprise/; Roger L. Phillips, Pirate 
Accessory Liability: Developing a Modern Legal Regime Governing Incitement and 
Intentional Facilitation of Maritime Piracy, 25 FLA. J. INT’L L. 271, 293–94 (2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2158023; Int’l Mar. Org., U.N. Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the 
U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, 1982, at 4 n.15, LEG 98/8/1 (May 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter IMO, Piracy], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/circular_letter_ 
3180.pdf (noting that art. 101(c) does “not explicitly set forth any particular geographic 
scope”). 
 45.  See Guilfoyle, supra note 40 (in the comments section following the article). 
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jurisdiction of any State.”46 In other words, “on the high seas” refers more 
to the location of the victim than the perpetrator of piracy jure gentium. 
Support for such a reading can be found both in the overall structure 
of the article and through a close reading of sections (a)(i) and (a)(ii). As 
for the overall structure, the chapeaux to art. 101 clearly states, “[p]iracy 
consists of the following acts . . . .”47 Thus, the plain language of the 
chapeaux more strongly supports the view of three separate acts constituting 
a single international offense rather than three separate international 
offenses with discrete jurisdictional requirements. Additionally, there is 
a great deal of substantive parallelism in sections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) suggesting 
that they serve to describe two contexts in which piracy jure gentium could 
occur, leading to the conclusion that “on the high seas” has nothing to do 
with facilitators. 
Art. 101(a)(i) refers to attacks “directed . . . on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft.”48 This subsection contains a geographic limitation (“on 
the high seas”) and a description of possible objects of piracy (“another 
ship or aircraft, or . . . persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.”).49 
Similarly, art. 101(a)(ii) contains a geographic limitation (“in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State”) alongside a description of the 
possible objects of an attack (“a ship, aircraft, persons or property”).50 
To be sure, the substantive parallelism described above would be more 
readily apparent if it were coupled with structural parallelism between 
arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii). For example, if art. 101(a)(i) read, “directed . . . 
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property aboard such 
an aircraft, on the high seas,” the geographic and objective directives 
contained in both sections would be written in the same order. The converse 
is also true. If art. 101(a)(ii) read, “directed . . . in a place outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of any State, against a ship, aircraft, persons, or 
 
 46.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101; see also Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, cmt. 4, at 
282, U.N. Doc A/3159 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 ILC Draft Articles], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc//texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_1_8_2_1956.pdf (“In 
considering as ‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, the 
Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or aircraft on an island 
constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an unoccupied territory.”). 
 47.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101. 
 48.  Id. art. 101(a)(i). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. art. 101(a)(ii). 
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property,” it would be clear that arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii) do nothing more 
than differentiate piracy on the high seas from piracy on terra nullius, 
and include both in the definition of piracy jure gentium. 
When viewed through the prism of the proponents’ argument, the 
semantic differences between arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii) are so easily 
explainable they seem trite. First, art. 101(a)(i) refers to “another ship” 
while 101(a)(ii) simply mentions “a ship.”51 This discrepancy comes 
from the oft-cited “two-ship” requirement for piracy on the high seas, 
which is meant to exclude acts of mutiny from the definition of piracy 
jure gentium.52 Such a requirement would be wholly irrational if applied 
on land, where ocean-going ships do not operate. 
Second, art. 101(a)(i) modifies “persons or property” with “on board 
such ship,” and no such modification is present in art. 101(a)(ii).53 This 
discrepancy has not been explicitly elucidated by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) or other legal scholars, but the plain language of the 
text suggests that the purpose of art. 101(a)(i)’s modification is to limit 
the potential objects of an act of piracy—apart from the victim ship 
itself—to persons and property physically aboard the victim ship, to the 
exclusion of property floating on the high seas. Ostensibly, such a 
provision would have been drafted to avoid the absurd result of a ship 
picking up seemingly abandoned cargo only to be accused of piracy 
under the law of nations by the ship from which that cargo was lost. 
Again, because ocean-going ships do not operate on land, such a 
modification would not be applicable to piracy on terra nullius. These 
 
 51.  Id. art. 101(a). 
 52.  1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 1 at 282 (“Acts committed on 
board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against 
persons or property on the ship, cannot be regarded as acts of piracy.”); IMO, Piracy, 
supra note 44, at 5 (“In order to constitute an act of piracy under UNCLOS, an attack on 
a ship must originate from another private ship or aircraft.”); see also Diana Chang, 
Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
273, 282 (2010); Jill Harrelson, Blackbeard Meets Blackwater: An Analysis of 
International Conventions that Address Piracy and the Use of Private Security 
Companies to Protect the Shipping Industry, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 283, 298 (2010); 
Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global 
Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1468 (2010) (“[T]he Convention on the High 
Seas/UNCLOS piracy definition requires the presence of two vessels for an act to qualify 
as piracy—an aggressor vessel must attack a victim vessel. Therefore, if hijackers board 
the victim vessel at its last port of entry and then overpower the ship’s crew on the high 
seas, this act would not constitute piracy under the Convention on the High 
Seas/UNCLOS definition, because only one vessel is involved. While some scholars 
have argued that two vessels may not be required under the Convention on the High 
Seas/UNCLOS definition, the majority view and the plain reading of these conventions 
indicate that their drafters envision the presence of two vessels in their definition of 
piracy.”). 
 53.  UNCLOS supra note 33, art. 101(a). 
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differences explain the existence of both arts. 101(a)(i) and (a)(ii) as 
separate sub-sections and the textual differences between them. The 
asymmetrical drafting could quite plausibly have been the result of the 
drafters’ preference for natural language over parallel sentence structure 
combined with the practical, mundane differences between piracy on the 
high seas and piracy committed on terra nullius. 
Even still, the interpretive task proponents face is not to develop a 
unified theory of UNCLOS art. 101. Rather, it is limited to posing two 
plausible readings of art. 101 and rendering it ambiguous as to a high 
seas requirement for facilitators. Such ambiguity appears to be present. 
Opponents argue the purpose of the phrase “on the high seas” is to 
distinguish art. 101(a)(i) from art. 101(c) by placing a high seas requirement 
on direct perpetrators but not facilitators of piracy. Proponents assert its 
purpose is to distinguish art. 101(a)(i) from art. 101(a)(ii), thereby 
distinguishing piracy on the high seas from piracy on terra nullius and 
including both under the definition of piracy jure gentium. Opponents and 
proponents of a high seas requirement for facilitators are both able to 
advance a plausible reading of UNCLOS art. 101 that leads to the desired 
conclusion. This renders the meaning of art. 101 ambiguous as to a high 
seas requirement for facilitators and invites inquiry into other areas, 
including the UNCLOS provisions surrounding art. 101, to determine its 
true meaning. 
B.  The Statutory Context Surrounding UNCLOS Art. 101                 
Suggests a High Seas Requirement 
Confining the analysis of a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators 
to the text of art. 101 alone might result in a split decision, but the 
context of art. 101 suggests piracy can only be committed on the high 
seas. Reading arts. 86, 100, and 105 of UNCLOS alongside the plain 
language of art. 101 provides evidence of the existence of a high seas 
requirement for facilitators of piracy jure gentium. 
Art. 86, “Application of the provisions of this Part,” introduces Part 
VII of UNCLOS.54 It reads, “[t]he provisions of this Part apply to all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in 
the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
 
 54.  Id. art. 86. 
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archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”55 This provision seems to 
suggest that Part VII of UNCLOS, containing art. 101, only concerns 
itself with that which occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of states. 
Indeed, one could go so far as to say that art. 86 incorporates itself by 
reference (“The provisions of this Part”56) into all articles contained in 
Part VII, including art. 101, and limits them to high seas acts. 
Additionally, and perhaps more persuasively, art. 100 describes the 
duty of all States to cooperate in repressing piracy, but it limits that duty 
to piracy that occurs “on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.”57 Art. 100 touches on a State’s duty to repress 
piracy as opposed to its power to do so,58 but art. 105 continues where 
art. 100 leaves off and limits a State’s power to seize “a pirate ship or 
aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy” to seizures occurring “[o]n 
the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”59 
The importance of art. 105 cannot be overstated since it codifies 
universal jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium.60 Indeed, proponents 
could rely on a syllogism created by using UNCLOS arts. 101 and 105, 
respectively: the facilitation of piracy is itself piracy; universal jurisdiction 
over piracy only exists on the high seas; therefore, universal jurisdiction 
over facilitation only exists on the high seas. 
For opponents, this sort of contextual argument may be viewed as 
overly simplistic and contrived. However, such complaints do not change 
the fact that there is an abundance of textual evidence surrounding art. 
101 that suggests a high seas limitation and no statutory context 
whatsoever that suggests the absence of such a requirement. The implicit 
lack of a high seas requirement for facilitators would appear somewhat 
out of place in the context of the accompanying UNCLOS provisions. In 
many ways, the same conclusion can be reached by looking at the 
drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101. 
  
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. art. 100. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. art. 105. 
 60.  Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., 13 ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.asil.org/ 
insights090206.cfm; see also ROBIN GEIß & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AT SEA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND 
THE GULF OF ADEN 149 (2011). 
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C.  The Drafting History of UNCLOS Art. 101 Suggests a                   
High Seas Requirement 
Like its statutory context, the drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101 is 
best characterized by evidence of a high seas requirement for pirate 
facilitators that is convincing, if not dispositive, particularly due to the 
lack of evidence mitigating such a requirement. This section traces the 
history of piracy’s definition under international law as it relates to 
facilitators, beginning with the Harvard Draft Convention of 193261 and 
ending fifty years later with UNCLOS.62 The language of the provisions 
contained in these instruments, when read alongside their respective 
commentaries, suggests that the line between the 1932 Draft Convention 
and UNCLOS is a relatively straightforward one, further suggesting that 
an inquiry into the drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101 could properly 
consider texts other than UNCLOS itself, where such an approach might 
otherwise be unwarranted. 
1. 1932 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy 
The starting point for any historical inquiry into UNCLOS art. 101 
must be Harvard’s 1932 Draft Convention on Piracy.63 The Draft 
Convention was the result of a League of Nations decision in 1924 to 
codify certain aspects of international law that were ripe for codification.64 
After reviewing the existing state of the law and sending detailed 
questionnaires to various states, Harvard Law School completed its Draft 
Articles in anticipation of the first Conference for the Codification of 
International Law, to be held in 1930.65 Though this conference did not 
bear much fruit, Harvard’s work on piracy formed the  basis for 
subsequent discussions of the definition of piracy jure gentium by the 
International Law Commission, the United Nations, and its Member States. 
Both the text and commentaries of the 1932 Draft Convention on 
piracy strongly suggest a high seas requirement for facilitators. As for 
the text of art. 3 of the Draft Convention, the article providing the definition 
 
 61.  Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23. 
 62.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101. 
 63.  Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23. 
 64.  Francis Deák, Book Review, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 (1930) (reviewing 
Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Draft Conventions on Nationality, 
Responsibility of States, Territorial Waters). 
 65.  Id. 
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of piracy jure gentium, the drafters of the Harvard Convention chose the 
following language: “Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a 
place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state: . . . [a]ny act of 
instigation or of intentional facilitation of [the direct commission of 
piracy or the knowing and voluntary operation of a pirate ship].”66 This 
language makes a high seas requirement for facilitators quite plain, but 
the explanatory note accompanying art. 3 is even more explicit: 
By this clause, instigations and facilitations of piratical acts, previously 
described in the Article are included in the definition of piracy. Obviously, 
convenience is served by this drafting device. The act of instigation or 
facilitation is not subjected to the common jurisdiction unless it takes place 
outside territorial jurisdiction.67 
Thus there can be no doubt that, at least as of 1932, the general consensus in 
the international community was that a facilitator of piracy must be 
physically present on the high seas in order to be subject to universal 
jurisdiction. 
2.  1955 International Law Commission’s Debate on Maritime Piracy 
The next time the definition of piracy under international law was taken 
up in a comprehensive fashion was in 1955 when the ILC was preparing 
its 1956 Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries.68 
In preparing the Articles, the ILC not only used the Harvard Draft 
Convention as a starting point for its discussion on piracy,69 but the Special 
Rapporteur also explicitly endorsed both the Harvard Draft Articles and 
the commentary attached to those articles: 
Mr. FRANCOIS (Special Rapporteur) said that the subject of piracy had been 
studied very thoroughly by the Harvard Research Centre, to which Professor 
Joseph W. Bingham had submitted an exhaustive report, together with the text of a 
draft international convention consisting of 19 articles published by the Harvard 
Law School in 1932. He had felt that he could not do better than to take the 
principal articles in Professor Bingham’s report, and the comments thereon, 
as a basis for the discussion on the subject of piracy, dealt with in articles 23 et 
seq of his own sixth report. His own draft had only six articles on piracy, 
namely, articles 23 to 28. He had attached no comment to his individual articles, 
that appended to the Harvard articles, to which he referred members, being 
exhaustive and entirely satisfactory.70 
 
 66.  Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 743. 
 67.  Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
 68.  1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46. 
 69.  See Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
37, para. 29, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955. 
 70.  Id. 
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From that general endorsement, the Special Rapporteur then turned to 
the definition of piracy jure gentium, noting at the outset that the 
definition was: 
based on three important principles: the principle that animus furandi did not 
have to be present; the principle that only acts committed on the high seas could 
be described as piracy; and the principle that acts of piracy were necessarily 
acts committed by one ship against another ship—which ruled out acts 
committed on board a single vessel.71 
At this early stage, the ILC appeared to favor an even narrower conception 
of the high seas requirement for piracy jure gentium, citing Oppenheim 
for the proposition that even acts that occur “by descent from the open 
sea . . . on an island unappropriated by a civilized Power” do not fall 
under universal jurisdiction.72 However, in an ILC meeting later that 
year, the Commission voted 11 to 1 in favor of assimilating “to the high 
seas territory not under the jurisdiction of any State” into the language of 
the draft.73 
After introducing and describing the three overriding principles from 
the Harvard Draft Convention, the Special Rapporteur invited the ILC 
members to vote on each of the three principles one by one.74 Of the ten 
ILC members surveyed, two explicitly affirmed the Special Rapporteur’s 
contention that universal jurisdiction over piracy was limited to acts on 
the high seas, seven were silent as to a high seas requirement, and only 
one specifically disavowed the high seas requirement.75  The lone dissenter, 
French jurist Georges Scelle, argued against a formalistic definition for 
piracy jure gentium and in favor of one based only on “the nature of the 
act.”76 However, Scelle was rebuffed by the Special Rapporteur, who 
opined that Scelle’s position resulted from “his keen concern to establish 
an international police,” and noted that the adoption of his proposal “would 
only serve to complicate the issue.”77 
Then, in a subsequent 1955 ILC meeting, the Commission considered 
a proposal by A. E. F. Sandström of Sweden to include acts perpetrated 
 
 71.  Id. para. 32, at 40 (emphasis added). 
 72.  Id. para. 48, at 41. 
 73.  Summary Records of the 292nd Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 51, 
para. 24, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955. 
 74.  Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, supra note 69, para. 55, at 42. 
 75.  See id. paras. 56–84, at 42–44. 
 76.  Id. para. 70, at 43. 
 77.  Id. para. 79, at 43. 
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along the coast and within a state’s territorial jurisdiction in the definition of 
piracy.78 The renewed debate gave Scelle a chance to clarify his position. 
In doing so, he agreed that acts committed within the territorial jurisdiction 
of a state would come under the jurisdiction of the local  courts.79 
However, according to Scelle, questions of jurisdiction had no bearing 
on piracy’s definition under international law.80 In explaining his own 
amendments, Sandström further stated that he wished to promote the 
progressive development of international law rather than codify existing 
law.81 Ultimately, Sandström’s proposed expansion was struck down by 
six votes to four, with one abstention.82 The ILC debates began to move 
the issue of a high seas requirement for piracy jure gentium from the 
academic sphere to a more formalized structure. 
3.  1956 ILC Draft Articles on Piracy 
The ILC’s 1955 debate on maritime piracy culminated in the 1956 
Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries  (“Draft 
Articles”). Discussion of the Draft Articles, which were eventually 
incorporated into the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, echoes 
the ILC debates and stresses the importance of the Harvard Draft 
Convention.83 To wit, the first of the ILC’s 1956 commentaries on piracy 
reads: 
In its work on the articles concerning piracy, the Commission was greatly 
assisted by the research carried out at the Harvard Law School,  which 
culminated in a draft convention of nineteen articles with commentary, prepared 
in 1932 under the direction of Professor Joseph Bingham. In general, the 
Commission was able to endorse the findings of that research.84 
Yet despite this endorsement, the ILC changed the form of its piracy 
definition by moving the phrase, “in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State” out of the chapeaux and into the body of the article.85 Opponents 
have cited this amendment as evidence of the uncertainty around 
whether the requirement survived the Harvard Draft Convention and 
1955 ILC debates.86 However, the most natural reading of both the text 
 
 78.  Summary Records of the 292nd Meeting, supra note 73, para. 9, at 52. 
 79.  Id. para. 11, at 52. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. para. 16, at 53. 
 82.  Id. para. 21, at 53. 
 83.  United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 619 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 84.  1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 1, at 282. 
 85.  Id., art. 39, at 282. 
 86.  Jon Bellish, Breaking News from 1932: Pirate Facilitators Must Be Physically 
Present on the High Seas, EJIL: Talk! (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-
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and subtext of the ILC’s commentary concerning the 1956 Draft Articles 
suggests the amendment was made to differentiate piracy committed on 
the high seas from that committed on terra nullius and to include them 
both within piracy’s definition jure gentium. It therefore appears unlikely 
the ILC made the amendment to differentiate acts of direct perpetration 
from acts of facilitation and to place divergent jurisdictional limitations 
upon each. 
The text of the ILC’s commentary explicitly states, “[i]n considering 
as ‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State, the Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or 
aircraft on an island constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an 
unoccupied territory.”87 This intent is a clear departure from the language of 
the Harvard Draft Convention definition (“in a place not within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state”),88 used in lieu of, not in addition to 
and distinct from, the phrase “on the high seas.” Such a departure, if it 
were meant to be more substantive in nature, would undoubtedly have 
been worth noting in the commentary, especially in light of the ILC’s 
strong general endorsement of the Harvard Draft Convention. 
The subtext of the ILC’s commentary on art. 39 of the Draft Articles 
further suggests that a high seas requirement for facilitators was 
incorporated into the 1956 Draft Articles. The ILC commentary begins 
by stating it “had to consider certain controversial points as to the essential 
features of piracy.”89 It went on to list the conclusions reached for each 
of the six points, namely that: 1) animus furandi is not required; 2) “private 
ends” are required; 3) piracy can only be committed by a private ship; 4) 
“[p]iracy can be committed only on the high seas or in a place situated 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State, and cannot be committed 
within the territory of a State or in its territorial sea”; 5) piracy can be 
committed from a ship or an aircraft, and; 6) acts committed on board a 
single ship cannot be regarded as piracy.90 Conspicuously absent from 
the list is any mention of a high seas requirement for facilitators, save for 
 
news-from-1932-pirate-facilitators-must-be-physically-present-on-the-high-seas/ (comment 
by Douglas Guilfoyle, posted Sept. 20, 2012 at 11:22 AM). 
 87.  1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 4, at 282 (noting that “outside the 
jurisdiction of any State” could also refer to attacks by aircraft over a larger unoccupied 
territory). 
 88.  Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 743. 
 89.  Id. cmt. 1, at 282. 
 90.  Id. 
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the explicit affirmation that as a general proposition piracy can only be 
committed on the high seas or another place outside the territory of a single 
state.91 Thus, opponents’ claim that the transformation  in piracy’s 
definition between the 1955 ILC preparatory debates and the 1956 Draft 
Articles is evidence of the demise of a high seas requirement for 
facilitators does not withstand close scrutiny. 
4.  1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS 
The remaining history of piracy’s definition under international law as 
it relates to incitement and intentional facilitation—from the 1956 ILC 
Draft articles to UNCLOS in 1982—is relatively straightforward. Art. 39 
of the 1956 Draft Articles appeared in the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas with several superficial grammatical changes and only one 
substantive change: that an aircraft can be the victim of piracy on the 
high seas.92 The definition in the 1958 Geneva Convention was copied 
verbatim into UNCLOS art. 101, where it has remained untouched and 
 
 91.  Bellish, supra note 86. 
 92.  Compare 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, art. 39, with Geneva 
Convention, supra note 24, art. 15. 
Article 39: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(1)  Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed: 
(a)  On the high seas, against another ship or against persons or property on 
board such a ship; 
(b)  Against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State. 
(2)  Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft. 
(3)  Any act of incitment or of intentional facilitation of an act described in 
sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article. 
1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, art. 39. 
Article 15: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
1.   Any illegal act of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed: 
(a)  On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(b)  Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
2.  Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
3.  Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article. 
Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 15. 
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seldom discussed since its entry into force in 1982.93 To illustrate this, 
despite its generally thorough nature, the seven volume treatise, United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, gives 
UNCLOS art. 101(c) relatively brief treatment, noting only that the 
section exists, that attempts to commit piracy are not explicitly included 
in the article’s application, and that, per UNCLOS art. 58, para. 2, the 
definition of piracy applies to acts that take place within the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of a single state.94 
Opponents will point to piracy’s treatment during the drafting of 
UNCLOS alongside the chart in Part II, supra, and argue that the above 
historical characterization should not be given much weight. They might 
argue that, rather than speaking to the intent of the drafters, the history 
of piracy’s definition jure gentium is the result of poor workmanship, 
which itself stems from the simple fact that maritime piracy was not of 
much import during the development of the positive international law on 
the topic.95 Piracy’s reemergence was not predicted by many, if any, 
scholars or practitioners of international law. 
Yet the available evidence, though weaker than a strong proponent of 
a high seas requirement might like, counsels against such an interpretation. 
There is no question that the drafters of the Harvard Convention believed a 
high seas requirement for facilitators existed, and there is nothing in the 
subsequent history suggesting a deviation from that position. The ILC 
explicitly endorsed the Harvard Draft Convention, debated the merits of 
a high seas requirement, and seemed to conclude that, at least as a matter 
of international law as it existed in 1955, universal jurisdiction only 
existed over acts committed on the high seas. One year after the 1955 
debate, the ILC re-worked the structure of the definition of piracy, but 
the available evidence suggests that this modification left unchanged the 
proposition that universal jurisdiction could not be asserted on individuals 
operating solely within the jurisdiction of a state. There is nothing in the 
remaining history to suggest that subsequent stewards of the definition 
of piracy jure gentium ever intended to deviate from the guidance 
contained in the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention. 
 
 93.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101. 
 94.  3 CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF 
LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 202 
(Myron H. Nordquist, Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995). 
 95.  See, e.g., Bellish, supra note 86 (comment by Douglas Guilfoyle, posted Sept. 
20, 2012 at 11:22 AM). 
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Moreover, even if it could be said with certainty that drafters from 1932 
to 1982 simply failed to consider a high seas requirement for facilitators, 
such a fact would hardly be sufficient evidence that the requirement no 
longer exists. Customary international law cannot develop by accident but 
requires state practice and opinio juris.96 The question of whether a high 
seas requirement for facilitators of piracy exists should not be answered 
using policy-favorable readings of UNCLOS’s text or its drafting history. 
Rather, the inquiry should be based on a disinterested analysis of the text, 
statutory context, and drafting history of UNCLOS alongside the underlying 
policy rationale behind asserting universal jurisdiction over maritime 
piracy. This final source of analysis—underlying policy rationale—will be 
discussed in the following section. 
D.  The Possible Policy Rationales Behind Universal Jurisdiction               
Over Piracy Suggest a High Seas Requirement 
Though on balance, the textual, contextual, and historical analyses above 
suggest the existence of a high seas requirement for facilitators, inquiry 
into the underlying policy rationale behind piracy’s status as a crime of 
universal jurisdiction may provide some additional insight. This section 
will discuss six potential rationales for establishing universal jurisdiction 
over pirates, explain the respective merits and demerits of each, and 
consider their implications vis-à-vis a high seas requirement for 
facilitators. The conclusion that flows from this analysis is similar to that 
which resulted from the previous inquiries. Foundational principles of 
international law combine with a faithful reading of history to make a 
reasonably convincing case in favor of a high seas requirement, with only a 
policy-favorable reading of that same history standing to rebut the case. 
1. Inherent Heinousness—Against a High Seas Requirement 
The most prolific, indeed the prevailing, rationale advanced to explain 
piracy’s status as the paradigmatic universal jurisdiction offense is the 
alleged inherent heinousness of the crime.97 This argument has carried a 
 
 96.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; PARRY AND GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 109 (John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2d ed. 2004); C.M. Chinkin, The 
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 850, 857 (1989); Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International 
Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665 (1953). 
 97.  See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, § 233 (1833) 
(“[A]lthough the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment 
of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from this rule those 
villains, who, by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public 
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great deal of weight because it is virtually undisputed that the crime of 
piracy is the doctrinal foundation for the more recent push towards 
universal jurisdiction over indisputably heinous crimes such as genocide 
and torture.98 If it were true that piracy was the first crime to be viewed 
by the international community as truly reprehensible, that fact would 
militate against a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators. If universal 
jurisdiction is predicated upon piracy’s heinousness, and customary  
international law included facilitation of piracy in the definition of 
piracy itself, it would be difficult to argue that something as formalistic 
as a facilitator’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a state 
protected him from a charge of piracy jure gentium. 
Despite its success, this analogy appears overworked. According to 
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the heinousness analogy 
“has spread with extraordinary speed and has not been subjected to 
systematic debate, partly because of the intimidating passion of its 
 
security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, 
and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they 
attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundation of their common 
safety. Thus, pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall.”); 15 
T.B. HOWELL, The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three others, at the Court of 
Vice-Admiralty, at Charles-Town, in South-Carolina, for Piracy, A.D. 1718, in A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1231, 1235 (1812) (“As to the heinousness or 
wickedness of [piracy], it needs no aggravation, it being evident to the reason of all 
men.”); PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIV., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES 
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 45–47 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES], available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf, at 27 or 45 
(listing piracy alongside slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and torture as “Serious Crimes Under International Law”); A. Hays Butler, 
The Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction: A Review of the Literature, 11 CRIM. L.F. 353, 
356 (2000) (describing a rationale that “focuses on the nature of the offence, rather than 
its locale.”). 
 98.  See, e.g., In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 
1985) (“Piracy is the paradigm of an offense ‘against the common law of nations’. . . The 
principle that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes are subject to 
universal jurisdiction found acceptance in the aftermath of World War II.”); Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he torturer has become—like the 
pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 147 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (analogizing torture to piracy as it relates to 
universal jurisdiction); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 195–96 (2004) [hereinafter 
Piracy Analogy] (describing the evolution of the piracy analogy). 
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advocates.”99 Professor Eugene Kontorovich summarized the troubled 
nature of the heinousness rationale best, saying it “begins with what many 
international lawyers believe should be the proper model of [universal 
jurisdiction]—the moral enormity of the offense. Defining [universal 
jurisdiction] as based on heinousness, the account then anachronistically 
shoehorns piracy [universal jurisdiction] into that model.”100 
The central flaw with the heinousness argument for universal jurisdiction 
over piracy is that it woefully ignores the state practice of supporting 
privateers, who performed the same acts as pirates with the same 
motives, but who did so under the color of state authority.101 Rather than 
being put to death for piracy, privateers were deemed to have not 
committed a crime at all.102 All nations acknowledged the right of other 
nations to authorize such commerce raiding, and privateering was a valid 
defense against charges of piracy.103 
The central consideration underlying the rebuttal of the heinousness 
theory is that there was very little functional difference between the 
individualized acts and intentions of pirates and privateers.104 Both groups 
stole goods from non-combatants through the threat of violence, and made 
good on that threat if goods were not turned over.105 Similarly, both groups 
 
 99.  Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF., 
July-Aug. 2001, at 86, 86, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/ 
article/163/28174.html; see also Steven W. Becker, Universal Jurisdiction: How Universal Is 
It? A Study of Competing Theories, 12 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 57 (2002/2003) (noting 
the flawed nature of the heinousness rationale). 
 100.  Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy 
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 137 
(2004) [hereinafter Implementing Sosa]. 
 101.  See Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 210 (“Privateering was a form of nationally 
sponsored piracy which reached its peak in the late 18th  and early 19th centuries. 
Privateers engaged in the exact same conduct as pirates: seizing merchant shipping 
through threat of lethal force. Yet the latter were not subject to universal jurisdiction. 
They were not even regarded as criminals, and a captured privateer would eventually be 
repatriated to his home state.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 102.  DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY 
OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES, at xvii–xviii (1995). 
 103.  Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 210. 
 104.  As will be explained in Part III(D)(3), infra, letters of marque and reprisal were 
accompanied by instructions limiting the nations whose ships a privateer could plunder, 
and the proceeds were distributed through a prize court. State sanction and formalized 
processes certainly distinguish privateering from piracy as a general conceptual matter. 
However, for the purposes of the inherent character of the acts and mental states under 
which the acts were committed, the two are nearly identical. 
 105.  Manuel Schonhorn, Postscript to DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE 
PYRATES 705 (Manuel Schonhorn ed., 1999) (1724) (“[I]t was the overwhelming numbers [of 
men] on a pirate ship that prevailed, and usually without violence.”); Piracy Analogy, 
supra note 98, at 214 (“If a merchant vessel would not surrender, privateers, like pirates, 
would resort to arms.”). 
BELLISH (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2016  4:38 PM 
[VOL. 15:  115, 2013]  A High Seas Requirement 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 141 
plundered for their own pecuniary gain.106 These similarities did not go 
unnoticed. Courts openly recognized the similarity between piracy and 
privateering, describing the former as “privateering without a commission 
or letters of marque,”107 and noting that a commission to cruise determined 
whether one was a pirate or not.108 Yet the pirate was subject to a death 
sentence under universal jurisdiction while the privateer could receive no 
penalty under any theory of jurisdiction. 
Logically, if the act of armed robbery at sea for personal pecuniary 
gain were so inherently heinous an act as to merit universal jurisdiction, 
states would not have sanctioned it through the issuance of letters of 
marque and reprisal. This purely formalistic approach to robbery at 
seabelies the notion that universal jurisdiction over piracy arose because 
of its heinousness. Although the heinousness rationale suggests the absence 
of a high seas requirement for facilitators, state practice strongly suggests 
that something other than the inherent heinousness of the offense was the 
basis for universal jurisdiction for piracy. 
 
 106.  Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 214 (“After the prize proceeding, the 
government would take its share of the prize’s value (usually ten percent) and the rest 
would be divided between the privateer’s owners, officers, and crew in accordance with 
a formula set out in the ship’s articles.”). This is not to say that desire for personal 
pecuniary gain is required to satisfy the “private ends” requirement, which is much broader. It 
is only to say that personal pecuniary gain most certainly fits within the “private ends 
requirement.” See, e.g., Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 857; Report of the 
Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc. C.196.M.70 1927 V, at 117 
(1927) (“Certain authors take the view that desire for gain is necessarily one of the 
characteristics of piracy. But the motive of the acts of violence might be not the prospect 
of gain but hatred or a desire for vengeance. In my opinion it is preferable not to adopt 
the criterion of desire for gain, since it is both too restrictive and contained in the larger 
qualification ‘for private ends.’ It is better, in laying down a general principle, to be 
content with the external character of the facts without entering too far into the often 
delicate question of motives. Nevertheless, when the acts in question are committed from 
purely political motives, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy involving 
all the important consequences which follow upon the commission of that crime. Such a 
rule does not assure any absolute impunity for the political acts in question, since they 
remain subject to the ordinary rules of international law.”). 
 107.  H.M. Advocate v. Cameron & Others, (1971) S.L.T. 202, 204 (Scot.). 
 108.  United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 656 n.2 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494); 
see also United States v. The Ambrose Light, etc., 25 F. 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); 
Davison v. Seal-Skins, 7 F. Cas. 192, 196 (C.C.D. Conn. 1835) (No. 3,661) (recounting 
how the U.S. Navy released “a nest of pirates” from custody upon learning that they had been 
acting under Argentinean commission). 
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2.  Protecting the Freedom of Navigation—Against a                                  
High Seas Requirement 
A separate, though closely related, account of universal jurisdiction 
over piracy is that common jurisdiction was deemed appropriate because 
pirates prey on global shipping lanes, disrupting the flow of international 
commerce, which all states have an interest in protecting.109 Like the 
heinousness rationale, universal jurisdiction based on the freedom of 
navigation would suggest that a high seas requirement for facilitators 
does not exist. If crimes affecting the freedom of navigation deserve 
universal jurisdiction, then it should not matter whether a pirate financier 
facilitates from land or the high seas. 
In a sense, those who support this argument probably stand on more 
solid ground than those who support the heinousness rationale. Protecting 
international shipping lanes is based on a well-established principle of 
the Westphalian system—freedom of the high seas—announced by Hugo 
Grotius in the early 17th century.110 The heinousness rationale, on the 
other hand, is based solely on an anachronistic reading of history driven 
by contemporary policy preferences. 
Nonetheless, state practice during piracy’s Golden Age undermines 
the freedom of navigation rationale in the same way it does  the 
heinousness rationale. Since privateers and pirates performed the exact 
same acts for the exact same reasons, they both disrupted the freedom of 
navigation. Yet piracy was considered a crime of universal jurisdiction 
while privateering was not a crime at all. The freedom of navigation 
rationale, like the heinousness rationale, runs counter to the well-
documented state practice concerning privateers. A fair reading of history 
suggests that both rationales were developed long after universal 
jurisdiction was established over piracy. Neither rationale drove states’ 
decision-making process when they made piracy the first and only crime 
of universal jurisdiction. 
 
 109.  See, e.g., Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Crime, with Comment, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 566 (Supp. 1935) (“The competence is 
perhaps better justified at the present time upon the ground that the punishable acts are 
committed upon the seas where all have an interest in the safety of commerce and where 
no State has territorial jurisdiction.”); see also Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596, 599–600 (2003) (noting how piracy 
affects the international community at large, and that a state exercising universal 
jurisdiction over a pirate is acting on behalf of the community). 
 110.  See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed., 
Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916). 
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3. Regulatory Capture—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement 
There is another potential explanation of why piracy was the sole crime 
of universal jurisdiction for centuries. Unlike the preceding two theories, 
this one fully accounts for the disparate treatment afforded to pirates and 
privateers. This rationale, if believed, counsels strongly in favor of 
a high seas requirement for facilitators. It may even suggest that piracy 
does not merit universal jurisdiction by modern standards. Simply stated, 
the theory is that piracy’s status as a crime of universal jurisdiction was a 
form of regulatory capture by states over the privateering industry. Under 
this theory, states made a collective, mutually beneficial decision to allow 
other states to engage in privateering. This scheme provided for all the 
benefits of authorized privateering while simultaneously punishing with 
death those who engaged in unauthorized privateering, i.e., piracy, from 
which no state could derive benefit. The available historical evidence 
suggests that privateering provided states with extensive political 
and economic benefits, which gives substantial support for the theory of 
regulatory capture. 
The two main evidentiary sources in support of the regulatory capture 
theory are the instructions that accompanied letters of marque and 
reprisal, and state practice as it relates to prize law. From the seventeenth 
to the nineteenth century, all seafaring states would issue letters of marque 
and reprisal, which permitted the holder to seize ships and property on 
the high seas.111 Often accompanying the letters of marque and reprisal 
were instructions listing the conditions upon which the letter was issued.112 
Though the contents of the instruction varied greatly, it always included 
a provision limiting the privateer to attacking ships that belonged to 
enemies of the issuing state.113 This practice allowed issuing nations to 
exert political and even war-like pressure on geopolitical foes in peacetime 
and wartime alike.114  Indeed, even the nomenclature of the practice, letters 
of marque and reprisal, suggests a political purpose. Seafaring nations of 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries saw privateering as 
a convenient political tool, one they were unafraid to use. 
 
 111.  Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 211. 
 112.  See id. at 213. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See id. (“The Articles of Confederation explicitly authorized ‘granting letters 
of marque and reprisal in times of peace.’”). 
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In addition to political benefits, privateering produced lucrative gains 
for both the privateers and the authorizing states. After a privateer 
captured a ship, that ship and all the valuable property thereon were 
taken back to the authorizing state and brought before a prize court.115 
There, a judge would determine whether the prize was taken in accordance 
with the instructions contained in the privateer’s letter of marque.116 If it 
was, the court would sell the ship and distribute the proceeds of the sale 
to the privateers, reserving a percentage for the state (usually around ten 
percent).117 With the possibility of these funds flowing in fairly regularly 
simply upon issuing letters of marque, it takes no stretch of the imagination 
to see why such a financial arrangement seemed highly beneficial to the 
states that utilized it. 
Understanding piracy in this way makes universal jurisdiction over 
pirates, and the uniform penalty of death imposed upon them, a relatively 
straightforward proposition. Seafaring nations decided, either collectively or 
simultaneously, that the political and economic benefits derived from a 
country’s own privateering activities outweighed the possibility that their 
merchants would be plundered by another nation’s privateers. However, 
the cost-benefit analysis shifted dramatically when sea robbers declined 
to follow the instructions on letters of marque, or sold the proceeds of a 
successful plunder themselves, keeping the ten percent commission out 
of their state’s coffers. Thus, the seemingly formalistic distinction between 
pirates and privateers arose, a discrepancy that is no longer puzzling when 
viewed from the perspective of a rationally self-interested seafaring state of 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. 
The proposition that regulatory capture supports universal jurisdiction 
over piracy is only a theory. Yet regulatory capture does a much better 
job in explaining how the similarities between privateers and pirates 
could coexist with such striking differences in treatment. If this theory 
proved to be true, there would be few left to defend piracy’s status as a 
crime of universal jurisdiction, let alone the application of universal 
jurisdiction on facilitators operating within one state’s territory. Universal 
jurisdiction over piracy would seem anachronistic and out of touch with 
modern international criminal law. The next section offers a more charitable 
explanation for piracy’s status as the first crime of universal jurisdiction. 
It is at least as historically plausible as the theory of regulatory capture 
and leads to the same conclusion: that a high seas requirement for pirate 
facilitators exists under international law. 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 213–14. 
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4. Evidentiary Shortcut—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement 
The fourth possible policy rationale for universal jurisdiction over piracy 
is qualitatively different from the three that precede it. Where the others 
treated universal jurisdiction as an extension of a state’s traditional 
jurisdictional powers under international law, this evidentiary shortcut 
rationale treats universal jurisdiction as a proxy for those traditional 
jurisdictional powers.118 Like the theory of regulatory capture described 
above, this rationale has yet to take hold in most mainstream commentary. 
Yet the logic behind it is fairly intuitive, and it accords with the theory 
that states are rational actors. Professor Eugene Kontorovich, the original 
author of this theory, describes the impetus behind it succinctly: 
Because pirates injured many nations, many nations could exercise jurisdiction 
under traditional rules. However, proving the existence of jurisdiction in any 
specific cases could be very difficult. Pirate ships were almost never caught in 
the act; rather, they were apprehended when they returned to port and attempted 
to sell their booty. Unless the pirate ship was caught red-handed, the forum state 
might have little evidence as to what particular nations’ ships the pirate had 
attacked.119 
In other words, absent universal jurisdiction, a prosecuting state would 
need to prove either the defendant’s or the victim’s nationality to assert 
criminal jurisdiction over that defendant. Asserting universal jurisdiction 
over piracy was simply a tool of convenience to bypass the difficulties 
associated with asserting criminal jurisdiction based on the nationality of 
the defendant or victim without knowledge of either of those facts. 
Providing further evidence that such an evidentiary shortcut was needed 
is the fact that pirates and privateers alike worked hard to mask their 
identities.120 From flying multiple flags to repainting their ships, sea 
robbers were nothing if not devious in their attempts to obscure their 
national identities.121 With the nationality of the pirates and the victims 
 
 118.  See Eugene Kontorovich, Universal Jurisdiction Over Non-Political Cases: An 
Evidentiary Theory of UJ 22 (Dec. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (“Universal jurisdiction over piracy is best understood as an evidentiary rule. It 
facilitated the prosecution of the crime in cases where traditional territorial or nationality 
jurisdiction existed but would be very difficult to affirmatively prove.”) [hereinafter 
Evidentiary Theory]. 
 119.  Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts 
(Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 342 (1996). 
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totally obscure—facts that a prosecutor must prove to assert traditional 
criminal jurisdiction—courts were left to assign jurisdiction based on the 
nature of the crime rather than the nationalities of the individuals involved 
in it. 
Yet none of the problems associated with identifying pirates’ or 
victims’ nationalities would apply to land-based facilitators. First, there 
will always be at least one clear and provable traditional jurisdictional 
nexus—the territory from which the facilitator operates—that could be 
relied upon. Additionally, reaching a land-based pirate facilitator and 
building a successful case against him would necessarily require fairly 
specific information about the pirates he facilitated. Such information 
would almost certainly include the pirates’ or victims’ nationalities. If 
universal jurisdiction over piracy is thought of as a tool of convenience, 
and none of the features giving rise to the need for that tool are present 
in the case of land-based facilitators, it stands to reason that universal 
jurisdiction was never intended to apply to land-based facilitators. 
If the two previous theories or regulatory capture and evidentiary shortcut 
are slightly obscure, the next two are squarely mainstream. Both 
justifications, practical difficulty of enforcement and lack of implications 
on sovereignty, find support in the works of scholars and jurists alike 
and strongly suggest that a high seas requirement for facilitators exists. 
5.  Difficulty of Enforcement—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement 
The first of the widely-advanced rationales for universal jurisdiction 
over piracy that suggests a high seas requirement for facilitators is based 
on the practical difficulty of capturing and trying pirates using traditional 
law enforcement mechanisms. This justification is not simply based on 
the fact that the crime is committed on the high seas,122 though that was 
certainly an important aspect.123 Nor is it based on the notion that the 
crimes associated with piracy were committed outside the territorial reach 
of all nations because the crimes in question were in fact committed on 
 
 122.  Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151 (noting that murder on the high 
seas was not originally subject to universal jurisdiction); see also United States v. Furlong, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197–99 (1820). 
 123.  See, e.g., Anthony Sammons, The “Under-Theorization” of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 126 (2003) (suggesting that the actual rationale for 
universal jurisdiction, as it arose in the context of piracy, was that pirates, “[t]hrough 
their utilization of international waters, . . . operated beyond the territorial reach of any 
single nation. For this reason, nations predicated their formulation of universal jurisdiction 
over piracy on the notion that the crime usually was committed in terra nullius, such as 
on the high seas where no nation exercised territorial control.”); see also Becker, supra 
note 89. 
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ships, which have long been recognized as territorial extensions of the 
state of their flag of registration.124 
Rather, the justification was even more practical. The pressures caused 
by the widespread nature of the crime of piracy, its warlike characteristics, 
the ease with which pirates could escape detection, and the high cost of 
maintaining a naval force large enough to fight foreign foes and pirates 
created the elements of necessity and urgency that lead to universal 
jurisdiction over the crime.125 
Under this rationale, the implications of a high seas requirement for 
facilitators are clear. There is no reason to believe that those who facilitate 
piracy from within the territorial jurisdiction of a state are any more or 
less likely to escape detection than any other criminal within that state’s 
boarders. Land-based facilitators neither engage in war-like tactics nor 
seek to evade navies at sea. From a law enforcement perspective, a land-
based pirate facilitator is no different from an individual facilitating 
common armed robbery. If this practical rationale is accepted, the policies 
underlying universal jurisdiction over piracy would not be served by 
prosecuting territorial facilitators under the theory of universal  
jurisdiction. 
6.  Lack of Implications on Sovereignty—In Favor of a                                      
High Seas Requirement 
A state’s criminal jurisdiction under international law is largely 
coincident to that state’s sovereignty.126 Consequently, the least 
controversial form of jurisdiction is over that which occurs within a 
 
 124.  Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151; see also S.S. “Lotus,” supra note 
21 at 7, 9, 22; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 250–
52 (1991). 
 125.  Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 152 (“The real problem was not the 
formal jurisdictional status of the high seas but the practical problem of enforcement. . . . 
The high cost of maintaining a navy, and the need to employ it against foreign fleets, 
made piracy perhaps the most expensive of crimes to police. Because of the vastness of 
seas, pirates could easily commit their crimes undetected.”); Abi-Saab, supra note 109, 
at 600 (noting the “elements of necessity and urgency” created by “warlike act[s] by 
highly mobile agents over the immensity of the high seas”). 
 126.  Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 188 (“International law regards criminal 
jurisdiction as a prerogative of sovereign states. As a result, the traditional limits on 
national criminal jurisdiction are largely coextensive with the limits of national 
sovereignty.”). 
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state’s territorial limits.127 Additionally, states can assert jurisdiction over 
acts committed by or against its nationals; some states have asserted the 
protective principle of jurisdiction, wherein they may adjudicate acts 
committed abroad by and against foreign nationals, but that nonetheless 
affect certain important interests of the adjudicating state.128 In addition 
to these more traditional bases for jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction 
exists over certain specific and narrowly defined crimes. For the first 
300 years of the Westphalian system of international law, this form of 
jurisdiction was reserved exclusively for piracy committed on the high 
seas.129 
With these fundamental principles in mind, the final potential policy 
rationale for universal jurisdiction over piracy is that such jurisdiction 
does not offend the traditional notions of state sovereignty precisely 
because the acts at issue occur on the high seas.130 If this rationale were 
found to be most persuasive, there can be no question that a high seas 
requirement for facilitators exists. Absent such a requirement, the 
contemporary international law of maritime piracy would violate all 
notions of sovereignty contained in the original justification for the 
establishment of universal jurisdiction over the crime. 
There is no shortage of support for the proposition that universal 
jurisdiction is fundamentally different from other types of jurisdiction 
because, “[u]nlike all other forms of international jurisdiction, the 
universal kind is not premised on notions of sovereignty or state consent. 
 
 127.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998) 
(“The principle that the courts of the place where the crime is committed may exercise 
jurisdiction has received universal recognition, and is but a single application of the 
essential territoriality of the sovereignty, the sum of legal competences, which a state 
has.”). 
 128.  See Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 124 n.59 (describing the bases for 
jurisdiction under international law and noting that “[t]he scope of the protective principle is 
uncertain and controversial, because under loose notions of harm and causation it could 
encompass a wide variety of extraterritorial conduct”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 
56, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The protective (or ‘security’) principle permits a State to 
assume jurisdiction over non-nationals for acts done abroad that affect the security of the 
State.”) (citations omitted). 
 129.  Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting 
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243, 244 (2010). 
 130.  See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL 262 (rev. ed. 1965) (1963) (noting the pirate fell under universal 
jurisdiction because “he has chosen to put himself outside all organized communities” 
and he “acknowledg[ed] obedience to no flag whatsoever”); see also 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1979) (explaining that 
pirates were universally punishable because they “renounced all the benefits of society 
and government”). 
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Rather, it is intended to override them.”131 As a result of its unique 
nature, universal jurisdiction has traditionally been applied quite sparingly 
for fear that excessive application might strain diplomatic relations between 
states.132 Indeed, the practical consideration of interstate relations formed 
the basis for two first principles of international law: the principles of 
sovereign equality and noninterference.133 At the time when universal 
jurisdiction was originally granted solely to prosecute pirates, the general 
rule was: “no nation could have jurisdiction outside its sovereign domain 
except with the consent of another nation.”134 
From this perspective, whether a perpetrator of piracy was physically 
present on the high seas at the time of the piratical act was of the utmost 
importance. Only if a pirate renounced sovereign protection by operating 
on the high seas, outside of the privateering licensing scheme, could he 
be subject to universal jurisdiction.135 This view can be seen in the 
writings of William Blackstone and Henry Kissinger alike.136 In fact, 
 
 131.  Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 184; see also Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation 
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no 
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the 
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which 
could impose such restriction.”); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the 
International Criminal Court, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (observing that universal 
jurisdiction can threaten international relations “because [assertions of universal 
jurisdiction] could be interpreted by the State where the crime has been committed as . . . 
a violation of its sovereignty”); Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause 
and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 168 (2009) (“By granting 
Congress the Define and Punish power, the Framers sought to provide a uniform 
standard of conduct on federal vessels and to ensure that the national government could 
deal with crimes that could embroil the country in disputes with foreign powers.”) 
[hereinafter Limits of Universal Jurisdiction]. 
 132.  Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 125 (“Assertions of [universal jurisdiction] 
by one nation can be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 
This can strain diplomatic relations and lead to interstate conflict.”). 
 133.  LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 27 (2003) (“Currently there is no global convention with respect to 
criminal jurisdiction. International law leaves States a wide measure of discretion in the 
matter, yet postulates the existence of limits. One of them is the noninterference 
principle, a corollary of the sovereign equality of States.”). 
 134.  Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 131, at 172. 
 135.  See Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151 (“Pirates rejected their home 
states’ licensing schemes, thus refusing their home states’ protection.”). 
 136.  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 130; see also Kissinger, supra note 99, at 87 
(“The very concept of universal jurisdiction is of recent vintage. The sixth edition of 
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UNCLOS allows states to strip pirate ships of their national character, 
further reflecting the concern surrounding issues of state sovereignty as 
it relates to universal jurisdiction over pirates.137 
If one accepts the premise that the principles of state sovereignty and 
noninterference are fundamental to international law, and that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction profoundly offends those principles, it should 
follow that acts committed wholly within a state’s jurisdiction should be 
treated differently than those committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
any state. The former should be exempt from judgment by a state with 
no connection to the act while the latter could withstand a lesser nexus 
under certain circumstances. If those who first asserted universal 
jurisdiction over piracy understood international jurisdiction as such, it is 
extremely unlikely that they intended to subject to universal jurisdiction 
a facilitator of piracy who operated wholly within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another state. 
IV.  THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE HIGH SEAS                                 
REQUIREMENT ON FACILITATORS 
On the surface, it may appear that a high seas requirement for facilitators 
of piracy jure gentium would result in impunity for the financiers of 
modern maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. The casual observer 
might argue that, by eliminating universal jurisdiction as a potential 
basis to bring a land-based facilitator to court, a high seas requirement 
would cut off an important avenue to end impunity that would otherwise 
have been available and widely used to combat piracy. As will be 
demonstrated below, political economic theory suggests,  and state 
practice shows, that true universal jurisdiction prosecutions of alleged 
pirates are exceedingly rare. In other words,  a high seas requirement for 
facilitators would have few implications on impunity for pirate kingpins. 
This section first looks at a state’s decision whether to pursue a universal 
jurisdiction piracy prosecution through the lens of political economic 
theory and concludes that it is rarely in a state’s interest to undertake 
such a prosecution. This theoretical analysis leads to two testable hypotheses: 
first, universal jurisdiction prosecutions should represent an extreme 
minority of the outcomes facing a suspected pirate; second, the overall 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1990, does not contain even an entry for the term. 
The closest analogous concept listed is hostes humani generis (‘enemies of the human 
race’). Until recently, the latter term has been applied to pirates, hijackers, and similar 
outlaws whose crimes were typically committed outside the territory of any state.”). 
 137.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality 
although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is 
determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.”). 
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clearance rate138 for maritime piracy should be lower than that for other 
crimes. The section concludes by surveying relevant state practice and 
finding the hypotheses posed to be largely accurate. 
A.  In Theory, Universal Jurisdiction Piracy Prosecutions                      
Should be Exceedingly Rare 
For the purposes of this section, let us assume that states  act in 
accordance with the modern version of the rational choice model of 
states. The rational choice model explains why states are unitary, rational 
actors in pursuit of their own interests on the world stage.139 Unlike the 
realist camp, which argues that states pursue only short-term plans to 
increase power relative to other states, the modern version allows for more 
breadth in a state’s conceptualization of its own interests .140 Once 
shunned by international lawyers, the rational choice model analysis is 
becoming more widely accepted, and the marketplace is now viewed as 
one of the most useful analogies for international relations.141 This type 
of political economic analysis suggests that market forces discourage 
universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions. This is true whether such 
prosecutions are viewed as a commons problem or as a public goods 
problem. This section will consider both potential framings in turn. 
1.  Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions as a Commons Problem 
A 1968 essay by Garrett Hardin described the lamentable situation of 
a large group of herders sharing common grazing land.142 Each herder 
enjoyed the full benefit of adding an additional cow to the pasture but 
only suffered a fraction of the cost of that additional cow because all the 
herders shared the degradation of the grazing land.143 Assuming all of 
the herders were rational beings, an over-grazed and un-productive pasture 
was an economic inevitability.144 Hardin’s solution was to privatize the 
 
 138.  The clearance rate is the ratio of offenders sent for prosecution to the total 
number of known offenders. 
 139.  Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 349–51 (1989). 
 140.  Id. at 351. 
 141.  See id. at 375. 
 142.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See id. 
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common property and compel each herder to both enjoy the full benefit 
and pay the full cost of his actions.145 This solution, dubbed “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon,” led to the economically and socially 
optimal result.146 
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons is thus fundamentally a story about 
internalizing externalities. Externalities arise whenever the conduct of a 
market actor unintentionally affects the circumstances of another market 
actor; they come in two forms: positive and negative.147 Negative 
externalities, like the land degradation described in Hardin’s essay, occur 
when a market participant acts in a way that is detrimental to another 
participant.148 Positive externalities, conversely, arise when a market 
participant acts in a way that benefits other participants.149 In either case, 
a community where externalities are present will benefit by internalizing 
those externalities, which will in turn lead to participants engaging in the 
externality-causing activity at more nearly optimal levels.150 Indeed, Coase 
famously argued that if certain conditions are met, market participants 
will naturally work towards internalizing externalities over time.151 
Just as one herder adding an additional cow to the common pasture 
creates a negative externality, universal jurisdiction prosecutions of 
pirates create a positive externality. The prosecuting state bears all the 
cost of a complex prosecution, while the entire community of nations 
benefits from the deterrent effect of that prosecution on future pirates. 
And to be sure, universal jurisdiction prosecutions, of pirates and non-
pirates alike, are both politically and economically costly for the prosecuting 
state.152 Just as herders with unaccounted-for negative externalities will 
perform too much of a damaging activity, states with unaccounted-for 
positive externalities will perform too little of a beneficial activity. 
 
 145.  Id. at 1247. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Abbott, supra note 139, at 388–89; WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 256 (1973). 
 148.  Abbot, supra note 128, at 388–89; RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 136, at 
257–58. 
 149.  Abbot, supra note 128, at 389; RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 136, at 258. 
 150.  Abbott, supra note 139, at 390. 
 151.  See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. AND ECON. 1 
(1960). 
 152.  Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118, at 15 (noting that wealthy states pursue 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions in a way that minimizes political and economic cost); 
REYDAMS, supra note 133, at 222 (observing that universal jurisdiction prosecutions are 
a luxury that only wealthy nations can afford); Garry J. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: 
Universal and National Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 78 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 2004) (noting the possibility that a universal jurisdiction prosecution could 
lead to diplomatic difficulties with other nations). 
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Piracy cases prosecuted by a state with a more traditional jurisdictional 
basis are more successful at internalizing externalities than universal 
jurisdiction prosecutions. Through prosecutions under the territorial, 
nationality, or protective principles of jurisdiction, the prosecuting state 
can further secure its territory, vindicate the rights of its  nationals, 
demonstrate to the international community its responsibility over its 
nationals, or protect an important state interest. The prosecuting state still 
bears the entire cost of the prosecution, but it enjoys more of the resulting 
benefits, namely that which flows from the interests territorial, national, 
or protective jurisdiction are meant to advance. Under this formulation, 
both Hardin and Coase would predict that very few states would pursue 
universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions. 
2.  Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions as a Public Goods Problem 
In addition to thinking about universal jurisdiction prosecutions in 
terms of commons problems and externalities, one can also think of them 
in terms of public goods and free riders to reach the same conclusion that 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions should be quite rare. Upon accepting 
the premise that universal jurisdiction prosecutions are public goods and 
that states are rational actors, economic theory inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that market pressures will force a decrease in the rate of such 
prosecutions.153 
Public goods have the two identifying characteristics of “jointness” and 
“non-excludability.”154 By jointness, economists mean that consumption of 
a good by one user does not reduce the availability of that good for other 
users.155 Non-excludability means that all participants can enjoy the benefit 
of a good, regardless of whether that user takes part in producing it.156 In 
 
 153.  See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of 
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (1999) (noting that, to the extent that 
something is a public good, theorists expect them to be under-produced by a market 
acting alone); see also RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS: 
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 15 (2005) (describing the conditions leading to the under-
production of public goods). 
 154.  Abbott, supra note 139, at 377; John A. C. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas and the International Political Economy, 28 INT’L STUD. Q. 5, 6 (1984); see 
also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 314–
15 (10th ed. 2006); RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 147, at 247, 259–64. 
 155.  Abbott, supra note 128, at 377. 
 156.  Id. 
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the case of a pure public good, “the marginal cost of providing another 
agent with the good is zero, and . . . no one can be excluded from enjoying 
its benefits.”157 Put another way, a pure public good is consumed equally 
by all market participants, regardless of whether any given participant 
actually contributed to the production of the good in question. 
Universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions, or perhaps more accurately, 
the benefits that flow from universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions, 
appear to be a prime example of a public good. By definition, universal 
jurisdiction prosecutions are performed by states with no territorial, 
national, or protective connection to the piratical act or acts at issue.158 
Thus, the core benefits of a universal jurisdiction prosecution, from the 
perspective of the state conducting the prosecution, are limited to the 
deterrent effect of that prosecution on future would-be pirates and the 
increased stability on the high seas resulting from that deterrence.159 
This deterrent effect, even if modest, is enjoyed by all nations who 
engage in or benefit from maritime transport, regardless of whether that 
nation participates in conducting universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions. 
The benefits flow automatically from the mere existence of the prosecution, 
and no additional expense is required for the non-prosecuting state to share 
in those benefits. Although it is not the case that all nations share in 
 
 157.  BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 2. 
 158.  PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 87, at 28. 
 159.  The prosecuting state has the additional benefit of improved standing within 
the international community for performing its duty to cooperate in the repression of 
piracy as articulated in UNCLOS art. 101. This benefit is not a public good, but states 
tend to cite the deterrence rationale more frequently than the duty rationale, although 
commentators often discuss both simultaneously. Additionally, the duty rationale does 
not represent the unanimous position of scholars. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, UN 
calls for tougher prosecution of pirates, THE RAW STORY (Nov. 19, 2012, 7:55 PM), 
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/11/19/un-calls-for-tougher-prosecution-of-pirates/ (“The 
United Nations on Monday called for stronger prosecutions of pirates and more action by 
shipping companies to deter bandits at sea.”); Thomas Kelly, U.S. Dep’t of State’s 
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Remarks at 
Combating Piracy Week: The U.S. Government’s Approach to Countering Somali Piracy 
(Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm (“Now let me 
turn to another aspect of our response – our efforts to deter piracy through effective 
apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of pirates and their  supporters and 
financiers. . . . Prosecutions is one key to deterrence, but this must include the prosecution of 
the masterminds and funders along with the gunmen.”); but see Elizabeth Andersen et. 
al., Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring Options in International Law 9 (One Earth 
Future Found., Academic Council on the U.N. Sys., & Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, 
Workshop Report) (“Some commentators read these and other provisions as creating a 
duty for states, which many are neglecting. Kenya, by this interpretation, would be seen 
as fulfilling its affirmative duty by prosecuting pirates on its soil. Other commentators 
reject this interpretation, arguing that the concept of universal jurisdiction permits, but 
does not require, states to prosecute maritime pirates.”). 
BELLISH (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2016  4:38 PM 
[VOL. 15:  115, 2013]  A High Seas Requirement 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 155 
the benefits equally, since those more intimately or frequently involved in 
maritime transport accrue a marginally greater benefit  from piracy’s 
repression than states whose connection is more tenuous, it is highly 
likely that all nations share in the benefit to some extent.160 Thus it is 
reasonable to conclude that the benefits flowing from a universal 
jurisdiction piracy prosecution have nearly all the characteristics of a 
public good. 
Once it can be established that something has the characteristics of a 
public good, it is almost axiomatic that the good will be under-produced 
in a functioning market.161 This under-production is a result of the well-
known problem of free-riding, where entities who incur no costs in 
creating a public good nonetheless obtain the full benefit of that good.162 
Much has been made of what must be done to counteract the public 
good/free-rider problem and ensure public goods are produced at a socially 
optimal level. The most famous of these approaches is Samuelson’s 
“first-best” provision of pure public goods,163 which states, “[a]t the first-
best social optimum the public good should be supplied so that the sum 
of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for those who benefit from the good is 
 
 160.  This is because piracy has a generalized impact on the cost of trade, and 
almost all of the world’s goods are transported at sea. Sami Bensassi & Inmaculada 
Martínez-Zarzoso, How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?, 
20 REV. INT’L ECON 869, 870 (2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ 
10.1111/roie.12000/pdf (finding that maritime piracy cost the international community 
$24.5 billion in terms of trade destruction in 2012); Int’l Mar. Org., IMO’s contribution 
to sustainable maritime development 3 (IMO Brochure), http://www.imo.org/ourwork/ 
technicalcooperation/documents/brochure/english.pdf (noting that 90% of the world’s 
trade is carried at sea). 
 161.  Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 153, at 16; see BATINA & IHORI, supra note 
153, at 15. 
 162.  See Abbott, supra note 139, at 378 (“[B]ecause of free-riding, [collective goods] 
are typically supplied at less than optimal levels, if at all.”); Tim Besley, Thiemo Fetzer 
& Hannes Mueller, One Kind of Lawlessness: Estimating the Welfare Cost of Somali 
Piracy 4 (Int’l Growth Ctr., working paper, Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.theigc.org/ 
publications/working-paper/piracy-somalia-costs-billions (“One of the central difficulties 
in combatting predation due to piracy is the need for international cooperation. There is a 
classic public good problem with the usual potential for free-riding.”). 
 163.  See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a 
Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 350–56 (1955); Paul A. 
Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 332–
38 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditures and Taxation, in 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND THEIR 
RELATIONS TO THE PRIVATE SECTORS (J. Margolis & H. Guitton eds., 1969). 
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equal to the marginal production cost.”164 In other words, states should 
pay for the public good proportionately to its perceived benefit from that 
public good. 
Such a mechanism is much easier to describe than to implement, and 
although various attempts have been advanced to achieve socially optimal 
results for public goods problems,165 the issue remains a vexing one.166 
Fortunately, in the specific case of universal jurisdiction piracy 
prosecutions, the public good exists alongside a more privatized substitute: 
piracy prosecutions under a traditional theory of jurisdiction. With a 
universal jurisdiction prosecution, the benefit to the prosecuting state 
comes in the form of deterrence, a benefit which flows to the 
international community as a whole. On the other hand, a more traditional 
prosecution produces additional benefit(s) for the state of securing its 
territory, vindicating the rights of its nationals, demonstrating responsibility 
over its nationals to the international community, or protecting an 
important state interest. Therefore, traditional piracy prosecutions look 
significantly less like a public good than their universal jurisdiction 
counterparts and are more likely to be produced in a market. 
Consequently, if one assumes states enter into a cost-benefit analysis 
when deciding whether to engage in complex international prosecutions, 
cases brought under traditional theories of international jurisdiction 
should be more common than those brought under the theory of universal 
jurisdiction. In both instances, traditional and universal jurisdiction piracy 
prosecutions, the economic cost of a prosecution is relatively high.167 Yet 
there are political costs associated with universal jurisdiction prosecutions 
that are less present in more traditional cases.168 These political costs come 
 
 164.  BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 9. 
 165.  E.g., Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE 
THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., Elizabeth 
Henderson, trans., 1958) (1919). 
 166.  See BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 1 (“[O]ne of the biggest problems [in 
welfare economics] is that there is a class of goods that provides utility or improves the 
efficiency of production, but which the private sector has great difficulty providing, 
public goods.”). 
 167.  Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting 
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 245, 262–66 (2010) (describing the 
difficulties inherent in piracy prosecutions, including establishing and proving who is a 
pirate, preserving evidence obtained on the high seas, and providing adequate counsel 
and translation services). 
 168.  Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118 (“The exercise of universal jurisdiction is 
politically costly for a state. It means embroiling one’s diplomatic apparatus in an imbroglio, 
and, quite likely, a confrontation with one or more states . . . it means burdening one’s 
court system with what will probably be an incredibly complex and problematic case; 
and it almost certainly means a great deal of domestic turmoil and controversy. Why 
would a country bother?”); see also Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial 
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in the form of potential friction between states, overly burdened domestic 
dockets, and a frustrated public.169 Moreover, while costs are traditionally 
borne by the prosecuting state, virtually all of the benefits of a universal 
jurisdiction prosecution flow instead to the international community.170 
Under traditional jurisdictional theories, more benefits flow directly to 
the prosecuting state. This is true whether one speaks in terms of 
internalizing externalities arising out of a commons problem or privatizing 
public goods to avoid a free-rider problem. 
B.  State Practice Shows Universal Jurisdiction Piracy                        
Prosecutions Are Rare 
The above economic analysis leads to two related hypotheses. First, 
for all the reasons stated above, universal jurisdiction piracy prosecution 
should represent a small minority of all outcomes that befall a suspected 
pirate. Second, as a more general matter, high seas piracies should be 
prosecuted at a lower rate than similar domestic crimes. This is because, 
even if costs are minimized and internalized to the greatest extent 
feasible, the cost of any given piracy prosecution will be higher than an 
inherently simpler prosecution of, for example, a domestic bank robber. 
This is due to practical difficulties inherent in piracy prosecution but rare 
in domestic armed robbery trials, including evidence preservation,  
provision of counsel and translation services, and prisoner transfer and 
repatriation issues. Moreover, even if a state with a traditional 
jurisdictional nexus engages in a piracy prosecution, such engagement 
does not negate the deterrent benefits that flow to the international 
community. This leaves behind two market forces, positive externalities 
and characteristics of a public good, that will continue to drive down the 
 
Reluctance: A New “Fourteen Points”, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND 
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, 256 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 2004) (noting that domestic judges, especially those with heavy caseloads, 
are likely to resent universal jurisdiction prosecutions). 
 169.  See Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118; Kirby, supra note 168; see also Beate 
Lakotta, An Expensive Farce: Germany’s Somali Pirate Trial Is Pointless, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/  
German-trial-of-somali-pirates-turns-into-pointless-and-expensive-farce-a-855252.html 
(expressing frustration over a Somali piracy trial in Germany). 
 170.  In recent years, the international community has worked out a “cost-sharing” 
mechanism for regional universal jurisdiction prosecutions.  This mechanism will be 
discussed in Part IV(B), infra. 
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rate of piracy prosecutions. This section tests the two above hypotheses 
against the available empirical evidence and finds that both have held 
true historically and in the modern context. 
1. Universal Jurisdiction Piracy Prosecutions Are a Minority Outcome 
Empirical evidence suggests universal jurisdiction prosecutions have 
represented, and continue to represent, a small minority of all piracy 
outcomes. For example, Alfred P. Rubin in 1998 surveyed piracy 
prosecutions over the past three hundred years and found fewer than five 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions.171 Though this figure does not include 
unreported universal jurisdiction prosecutions that took place in remote 
regions, with only five enumerated trials, universal jurisdiction prosecutions 
almost certainly represented a vanishingly small proportion of all piracy 
outcomes between 1698 and 1998.172 It is also worth noting that as early 
as 1867, universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions were being thought of in 
terms of internalized costs and externalized benefits: 
Besides [England is] not the only Power with large interests at stake. French, 
Americans, and Germans carry on an extensive trade . . . Why should we then 
incur singly the expense of suppressing piracy if each provided a couple of 
gunboats the force would suffice for the safety foreign shipping which is all that 
devolves upon . . . why should the English tax payer alone bear the expense?173 
Eugene Kontorovich and Steven Art picked up where Rubin left off 
and conducted an empirical study of piracy prosecutions from 1998 to 
2009, which includes the first few years of the resurgence of Somali 
piracy.174 They found only seventeen universal jurisdiction piracy 
prosecutions out of the 1158 reported attacks.175 Broken down further, 
Kontorovich and Art found a universal jurisdiction prosecution rate of 
0.53% for the years 1998 to 2007 and universal jurisdiction prosecution 
rate of 3.22% for the years 2008 and 2009.176 
State practice from 2008 to 2012 shows that the international community 
has taken steps to minimize the cost of universal jurisdiction prosecutions 
 
 171.  See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 346–47 n.13, 348 n.50 (2d ed. 1998); 
see also Piracy Analogy, supra note 88, at 192 (“[V]ery few criminal prosecutions for 
piracy can be found that depended on the universal principle.”). 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Besley et. al., supra note 162, at 4 (quoting The London and China Telegraph 
from Feb. 4, 1867) (alteration in original). 
 174.  Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 436, 436 (2010), available at www.asil. 
org/ajil/July2010selectedpiece.pdf [hereinafter Empirical Examination]. 
 175.  Id. at 444. 
 176.  Id. at 445. 
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and has recognized a commons/public goods problem that is inherent in 
such prosecutions.177 By pursuing a strategy that directs prosecutions 
towards regional nations and funds them largely through United Nations 
mechanisms, the international community is both minimizing the cost of 
piracy prosecutions and spreading that cost more equitably among the 
nations most directly benefitting from the prosecutions. Nonetheless, a 
universal jurisdiction prosecution remains a low-probability outcome for 
a captured pirate. A traditional universal jurisdiction prosecution would 
result from the capturing state conducting the prosecution of a pirate 
captured on the high seas.178 However, capturing states choose to simply 
release captured pirates eighty to ninety percent of the time.179 In response 
 
 177.  See, e.g., EU Naval Force Transfers Twelve Suspect Pirates to Mauritius for 
Prosecution After Attack on Merchant Vessel off Somalia, EU NAVFOR SOMALIA (Jan. 
25, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-transfers-twelve-suspect-pirates-
to-mauritius-for-prosecution-after-attack-on-merchant-vessel-off-somalia-2/ (noting the 
prisoner transfer agreement between the European Union and Mauritius); Support to the 
Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, COUNTER-PIRACY PROGRAMME ISSUE 6 
(U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime), June 2011, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_6_WV.pdf (describing the UNODC’s capacity building 
efforts); Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, COUNTER-PIRACY 
PROGRAMME ISSUE 7 (U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime), Sept./Oct. 2011, at 1, available 
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf (identifying 
the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme). 
 178.  UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a 
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons 
and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure 
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be 
taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties 
acting in good faith.”) (emphasis added). 
 179.  See Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 450 (noting that anti-piracy 
patrols continue to release most of the captured suspects); Brian Brady, Navy frees four 
out of five suspected Somali pirates, THE INDEPENDENT (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www. 
independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/navy-frees-four-out-of-five-suspected-somali-pirates- 
7626977.html (citing official UK Ministry of Defence numbers that 28 of the 34 ships 
boarded in 2008 were released and that 229 of the 279 pirates detained were released); 
First Italian Judgment in a piracy Case: Public Prosecutor of Rome Condemns 
Four Somali Pirates, OCEANUS LIVE (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.ocean 
uslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000545 (“Italy had adopted in the past against 
pirates the technique of ‘catch and release’, ie [sic] delivering pirates to the states to which 
they belong. This technique has been criticized by the UN Security Council because it 
was considered an incentive problem.”); US Planning, MARITIME SECURITY REVIEW 
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.marsecreview.com/2011/03/us-planning/ (“The prosecution 
of pirates is difficult. Jurisdiction is tricky, and stakeholder countries are often unwilling 
or unable to put them through their court systems. Out of an estimated 800 who have 
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to this elevated “catch and release” rate, nations conducting naval patrols 
have signed transfer agreements with regional nations including Kenya, 
Seychelles, Tanzania, and Mauritius, whereby the capturing state transfers 
the pirates to a regional nation to undergo a universal jurisdiction 
prosecution financed and supported by the United Nations and the 
governments of other states.180 This approach recognizes and seeks to 
ameliorate the market forces described above by moving toward a situation 
where states’ financial contributions to piracy prosecutions are 
proportionate to the benefits accrued through those prosecutions. 
Nonetheless, despite the concerted effort to increase the rate of universal 
jurisdiction prosecutions to date, such prosecutions remain a relatively 
rare occurrence. 
2.  Maritime Piracy is Prosecuted at a Lower Rate than Other Crimes 
Apart from predicting that a universal jurisdiction prosecution would 
be a rare outcome for a suspected pirate, the political economic theory 
discussed above would also predict the overall rate of piracy prosecutions to 
be lower than that of domestic offenses. Because prosecution rates are 
not generally reported by states, clearance rates are used as a proxy for 
prosecution rates.181 A crime is “cleared” when a suspect is arrested and 
referred for prosecution.182 The clearance rate is thus the ratio of those 
referred for prosecution to the total number of known offenders. 
In the United States, the clearance rate for all violent crimes is roughly 
forty-five percent, and twenty-seven percent for robbery.183 In the European 
Union, the clearance rates are even higher, with a clearance rate of seventy 
 
been turned over for prosecution, no witness could say how many had actually been 
prosecuted when grilled by Larsen. The closest they got to an answer was ‘very few.’”). 
 180.  E.g., Judicial international cooperation to end impunity, EUR. UNION EUROPEAN 
EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/judicial_cooperation_en.htm (“The 
EU has therefore signed transfer agreements with countries in the region—the Seychelles 
(2009), Mauritius (2011)—and is negotiating another one with Tanzania. At the moment, 
transfers to Kenya are possible on a case by case basis. The judicial systems of these 
countries were not fully prepared to cope with the additional complexities and workload of 
transferred piracy suspects. A joint EU/UNODC programme of support for the justice 
system in Kenya was launched in May 2009 to provide Kenya with practical assistance 
to cope with the extra demands associated with the prosecution and detention of piracy 
suspects (€1.75 million). Similar support programmes are available to the Seychelles 
(€0.78 million) and Mauritius (€1.08 million). The EU and its Member States are thus 
the largest contributor to the UNODC counter-piracy programme.”). 
 181.  Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 446. 
 182.  Id. n.43. 
 183.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008 CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES: PERCENT OF OFFENSES CLEARED BY ARREST OR EXCEPTIONAL MEANS 
tbl.26, (2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_26.html. 
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percent for homicide and forty-one percent for robbery.184 The average 
clearance rate for all crime worldwide is fifty-one percent.185 Compare those 
percentages to the 1.47% rate at which captured pirates were sent for 
prosecution between 1998 and 2009.186 If anything, that 1.47% rate is on 
the high side since it is well documented that a substantial fraction of pirate 
attacks go unreported.187 At best, the clearance rate for piracy is between 
sixty and eighty percent lower than the global average for all crimes. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The available evidence suggests that an inciter or intentional facilitator 
of maritime piracy must be physically present on the high seas to be 
subject to universal jurisdiction. The drafters of the 1932 Harvard Draft 
Convention on Piracy made it clear that incitement and intentional 
facilitation of piracy were included as a matter of convenience, essentially 
allowing for guilt by association. Rather than forcing the prosecuting 
state to show that each individual aboard a suspected pirate ship personally 
committed an act of piracy, or personally participated in operating the 
ship, mere presence aboard the ship would be enough to sustain a 
conviction.188 While it would be fair to say the reasoning employed by 
the Harvard Draft Convention was repeatedly endorsed throughout the 
next fifty years, at the very least it is clear that subsequent stewards of 
piracy’s definition under international law never explicitly deviated from 
the initial conclusion that facilitators must be on the high seas to be 
subjected to universal jurisdiction. Any arguments to the contrary rest on 
a policy-favorable reading of UNCLOS and its history, mistaking 
pronouncements concerning piracies committed on terra nullius with 
those related to the creation of separate jurisdictional requirements for 
direct perpetrators and facilitators. 
Furthermore, a high seas requirement is not likely to result in impunity 
for pirate kingpins who never leave dry land. From the premise that 
states are rational actors seeking to maximize self-defined benefits from 
 
 184.  Ming-Jen Lin, Does democracy increase crime? The evidence from international 
data, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 467, 471 (2007) (citing Interpol figures). 
 185.  Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 447. 
 186.  Id. at 444–45. 
 187.  Pirate attacks under-reported, forum told, EDMONTON JOURNAL (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/business/story.html?id=4ddff96f-a9ed-44 
e6-9c9b-27dbca7f9f2b. 
 188.  See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, art. 3. 
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operating on the world stage while minimizing the cost of doing so, it 
follows naturally that universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions are not 
necessary to reach pirate financiers and facilitators. The costs of such 
prosecutions are high and relatively fixed, regardless of which state 
conducts the prosecution. The benefits, however, are further internalized 
and therefore maximized when the state conducting the prosecution has 
a more substantial connection to the defendant. Moreover, the international 
nature of global shipping, combined with multiple avenues of sovereignty- 
based international jurisdiction, results in a situation where even if one 
state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prosecute, other states 
with traditional connections will be available to fill in the gap. For the 
reasons described above, states with more traditional jurisdictional nexuses 
are more likely to prosecute than those relying solely on universal 
jurisdiction. 
The answer to Chief Justice Marshall’s question thus remains unchanged 
by the two centuries that passed between United States v. Palmer and 
United States v. Ali. It cannot be believed that piracy jure gentium 
encompasses “the subject of a foreign prince, who, within the dominions 
of that prince, should advise a person, about to sail in the ship of his 
sovereign, to commit murder or robbery.”189 As it relates to the modern 
resurgence of east African piracy and the financiers and facilitators who 
turned that resurgence into an international criminal epidemic, that might 
not be such a terrible thing. 
 
 
 189.  Palmer, supra note 1. 
